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THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE
SETTING
WILLIAM R. MCLUCAS, HOWARD M. SHAPIRO
& JULIE J. SONG*
Beginning in 2001, the American corporate landscape experienced the
first of numerous scandals involving accounting irregularities, financial
fraud, and other instances of misconduct. In response, law enforcement
officials began an intensive effort to root out corporate fraud and to restore
public confidence in our capital markets.' That effort-and the
accompanying demands by law enforcement agencies that the corporations
involved waive their attorney-client privilege-is itself beginning to raise
profound issues for how corporations conduct business.
There are several issues to be considered as we evaluate the
government's recent heightened level of aggression in seeking privilege
waivers. First, over the last several years, cooperation with government
investigations-more often than not measured by whether the corporation
has waived its attorney-client privilege-has become increasingly critical as
law enforcement agencies have sought to restore public confidence in our
capital markets.2 Second, internal investigations conducted by corporate
* Mr. McLucas and Mr. Shapiro are partners at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP. Mr. McLucas co-chairs WilmerHale's securities department and is former Director of
Enforcement of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Mr. Shapiro co-chairs the
firm's litigation department and is former General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and a former Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York. Ms. Song is an associate in the firm's securities department.
1 See generally William R. McLucas & Paul R. Eckert, Sarbanes Oxley and the SEC's
Enforcement Program, in THE PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT VII-2-
1-3 (John J. Huber et al. eds., 2004) (providing background on the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
2 See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text; Marc B. Dorfman, Top 10 Securities and
Exchange Commission Enforcement Developments of 2004, 37 SECURITIES REGULATIONS &
L. DAILY (BNA) 469 (2005) ("The SEC's punishment of companies for failing to cooperate
is the Number One SEC enforcement development in 2004."); George Terwilliger Ill, GCs
and Business Managers Play Crucial Role in Responding to Business Crimes Investigations,
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counsel-the results of which are often demanded by the government in
exchange for "credit" for cooperation-now have particular significance.
3
In the context of governmental demands for waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, these internal investigations often turn companies against the very
executives and employees who are paid to act in the company's best
interests. As such, the process itself demands more careful evaluation than
has, to date, been brought to bear.
The current trend has, at a minimum, eroded our traditional adversarial
process and skewed the balance of power between government investigators
and their corporate targets. Over time, this process may well drive a wedge
between the corporate entity and the executives and employees the
company relies upon for the shareholders' benefit, even when these
individuals have done nothing wrong. It forces corporate managers to think
first of their own liability and not the broader good of the enterprise that
should be-and once was-at the core of their professional lives.
As we discuss below, the use of internal investigations by companies
and their boards of directors and cooperation by corporations with the
government are not new concepts. Beginning with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission's ("SEC" or the "Commission") "voluntary
disclosure program" in the 1970s and continuing through the 1990s with
several high-profile criminal inquiries, internal investigations and
cooperation-often without demands for waiver of the attorney-client
privilege-have played an important role in resolving securities
enforcement and criminal inquiries. Recent corporate scandals, however,
have led to an upset of this historical pattern, and instead, demands for
privilege waiver are now commonplace.
To be sure, in looking at the investor carnage from the collection of
recent accounting scandals, there are likely benefits from the government's
aggressive enforcement approach that we, as yet, cannot fully appreciate.
Improvements in corporate governance and aggressive activism by board
members in ensuring better accounting, better disclosure, and overall good
corporate citizenship, are already observable, at least anecdotally.
However, far broader questions about the impact of this new order remain
very much open to debate. What is the long term impact on the behavior of
executives and employees who believe that in their daily service for the
company, their personal behavior and interests are, in most instances,
aligned with that of the company? What will be the effect on Board
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15, 2005, at 13 (observing on the three-year anniversary of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act that "[flailure to cooperate can harden prosecutors' attitudes significantly and
render a bad situation even worse").
3 See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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members who, after the settlements of the private actions in Enron and
WorldCom, are now of necessity focused on their personal liability as well
as on their fiduciary duties? And what, if anything, can be done about the
enormous leverage of the government in requiring such inquiries and
waivers as the price of avoiding criminal indictment and/or demands in
governmental civil proceedings that are franchise threatening? How
reasoned and consistent is the government's approach? At what level in the
government are these decisions being evaluated? Have the broader
implications of this dramatic change in our adversarial system been
examined? We do not believe that we have yet seen the long-term
consequences for a corporation when, at the suggestion of any
unlawfulness, the government says, "Investigate yourself and report to us,
no privilege, no tactics, no reservations, and trust us, we will do the right
thing."
The issues raised by the broader use of internal investigations by
public companies and the current policy of the Department of Justice
("DOJ" or the "Department") and the SEC regarding waiver of attorney-
client privilege may well have profound consequences for the every day
functioning of a corporation. Indeed, there is some risk that management of
the corporate enterprise may well suffer as a consequence. We normally
expect that company executives act in the company's and shareholders' best
interests. Now we have to be concerned that those whom shareholders have
entrusted with management are, at the first hint of wrongdoing and inquiry,
sufficiently focused on and distracted by their own personal risk or liability
rather than the broader interests of the company, that these broad-based
waiver demands may well adversely affect the way companies behave.
As background, we briefly review the historical context of cooperation
by corporations, the current enforcement and regulatory landscape, the
attorney-client privilege and its applicability to corporations, and the
government's position on cooperation. We then assess internal
investigations and the implications for the relationship between
corporations and their executives and employees. We will discuss how the
current culture, in which the attorney-client privilege is waived in the
context of internal investigations, may create particularly acute problems
within a public company. Finally, we articulate our concerns over whether
this process and its impact on the loyalties of executives and employees will
soon change the way those executives and employees behave as fiduciaries
of the corporate enterprise.
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I. EVOLUTION OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AND POLICIES REGARDING
COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
We should begin with some perspective. The use of internal
investigations by public companies and their boards of directors, and
cooperation by corporations with government regulators, are not new
concepts. In the 1970s, the SEC announced its "voluntary disclosure
program" 4 concerning the suspected widespread practice of public
companies maintaining "off the books" slush funds, which were used to
make payments both abroad and domestically for political purposes and to
influence counter-parties, intermediaries, and government officials in
business transactions. The results were stunning: Hundreds of U.S
corporations came forward with disclosures about the existence of such
funds and the use of these "off the books" accounts to facilitate all manner
of questionable payments. 5 The consequence was passage of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in December 1977.6 The statute remains an integral
part of the federal securities laws. It outlawed foreign bribery, required that
greater accountability and internal controls be maintained by public
companies over their assets, and, in theory, became a critical tool of the
accounting profession and the SEC in ensuring that public companies
maintain sound internal controls and accurate books and records. The
voluntary disclosure program's approach to self-policing, remediation, and
cooperation became a part of the SEC's enforcement arsenal over the years
and, in numerous cases, was an effective tool for addressing a variety of
problems in corporate America.7
4 See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, 94TH CONG., REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE
AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 10- 13 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION]; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Economic Policy of the S. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong. (1975) (Statement of
Philip A. Loomis, SEC Commissioner).
5 See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 1.
6 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, amended by
Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988; Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
5001-03, 102 Stat. 1415, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78m(b)(3), 78dd-
1, 78dd-2, 78ff (2000 & Supp. 2005), amended by the Int'l Antibribery and Fair Competition
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366m 112 Stat. 3302.
7 See William R. McLucas et al., Common Sense, Flexibility, and Enforcement of the
Federal Securities Laws, 51 Bus. LAW. 1221, 1225 (1996) ("While the Commission
promised no immunity from follow-up scrutiny or prosecution, those companies
participating in the program were promised fair consideration by the agency as to whether
further action would be taken. The clear implication was that cooperation would be
rewarded."); DANIEL M. HAWKE, ROUNDTABLE ON ENFORCEMENT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
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Even prior to the corporate scandals of the past five years or so, a
similar approach to cooperation was employed by the DOJ in a number of
high profile corporate criminal inquiries.8 These precedents, along with the
Thompson Memorandum, 9 established the broad outlines under which such
inquiries and the process of seeking credit from the Department for
cooperation would be measured.
At the SEC, even before the Enron debacle and the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 10 then-Chairman Harvey Pitt (who, as an attorney in
private practice, had previously been quite effective in advocating the use of
such internal inquiries as an alternative to the standard SEC investigation)
pushed to formalize the critical considerations surrounding this process by
way of a formal SEC pronouncement. In 2001 the SEC formalized the key
elements of cooperation in its Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section
21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on
the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions in the
SEC's ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 1934-1981, at 26 (SEC Historical Society Oral Histories
Committee 2002) (stating that the voluntary disclosure program "shifted the burden of law
enforcement from government to industry... [w]rongdoers of every stripe, but especially
those at the country's largest corporations, were invited to admit their sins voluntarily in the
SEC's public filing room-or else face the commission's wrath").
8 See, e.g., United States v. Salomon Bros. Inc., 57 Fed. Reg. 29,743 (July 6, 1992). In
the Salomon Brothers case, the company allegedly submitted false and unauthorized bids in
violation of federal law and entered into unlawful agreements in violation of the Sherman
Act. See id. at 29,744-45. Although the company paid $290 million to settle civil charges,
the DOJ did not pursue criminal prosecution because the company, among other things,
conducted an internal investigation, replaced top management, and cooperated with
government investigators. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice
and SEC Enter $290 Million Settlement with Salomon Brothers in Treasury Securities Case
(May 20, 1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press releases/1992/
211182.htm. Similarly, in a case against Bankers Trust Corporation involving alleged
inappropriate diversions of unclaimed customer funds and related false banking entries, the
Department declined to pursue the most serious criminal charges (although the company did
plead guilty and was required to pay over $60 million) when the bank self-reported the
misconduct, undertook an internal investigation, and cooperated with government
investigators. See Did Bankers Trust Alter the Rules?, N.Y. L.J., CORP. CoUNs., Nov. 20,
2000, at S4 (citing Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. of N.Y. (Mar. 11, 1999);
Bankers Trust Statement on Settlement with U.S. Attorney (Mar. 12, 1999)); see also
generally Lawrence J. Zweifach, Internal Corporate Investigations, 905 PRACTICING L. INST.
531, 543 (1995) ("Some companies have been able to avoid being the target of a criminal
prosecution by fully disclosing all wrongdoing to the government."); Paula J. Desio, The
Regulatory Environment and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 1120 PRACTICING L.
INST. 301, 308 (1999) (reviewing the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice's
corporate leniency policy).
9 See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
10 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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Seaboard Matter (the "Seaboard Report").11 Since the Seaboard Report,
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, HealthSouth, and a litany of other such
headline-grabbing corporate scandals have dramatically escalated the
frequency and stakes associated with such inquiries at corporations. These
scandals have taken the once-episodic notions of an internal inquiry,
cooperation, and privilege waiver, to an everyday feature of the law
enforcement process.' 2
B. CURRENT ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE
In the aftermath of Enron and WorldCom, securities enforcement and
white collar criminal investigations have taken on renewed life. 3 The
President himself helped articulate the government's corporate crime policy
when he announced, in March 2002, a "Ten Point Plan to Improve
Corporate Responsibility and Protect America's Shareholders.', 14 Shortly
thereafter, in July 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and thus
introduced the most dramatic changes to the law enforcement and
regulatory landscape since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Among other things, Sarbanes-Oxley provided new regulatory and
remedial powers to the SEC. For example, the statute authorizes the SEC to
seek forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits, 5 officer and director bars and
penalties, 6 temporary asset freezes,' 7 and the barring of individuals from
the securities industry based on state regulatory proceedings.' 8  Sarbanes-
Oxley also granted the SEC, in administrative proceedings and civil actions
seeking the payment of disgorgement and civil penalties, the authority to
establish victim restitution funds so that those payments can be directed
11 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44969 [2001-2003 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,985 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigationinvestreportl34-44969.htm; see also infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
13 See Joseph Nocera, For All Its Cost, Sarbanes Law is Working, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2005, at CI ("[A]fter WorldCom, in an instant everything changed. Everyone in
Washington wanted to do something-anything-to show they were cracking down on
corporate fraud").
14 See President's Ten-Point Plan to Improve Corporate Responsibility and Protect
America's Shareholders, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/
corporateresponsibility/index2.html (last visited April 5, 2006).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
16 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(2), 77(t)(e).
17 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c).
18 See id. § 78o.
[Vol. 96
2006] DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 627
back to injured shareholders. 9 Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley created several new
criminal offenses and increased the maximum penalties for already existing
securities-related crimes.2 0
Equipped with new authority under Sarbanes-Oxley, as well as record-
high budgetary appropriations levels, the SEC's Enforcement Division has
reached historic levels of activity in the years since Enron.21 Between FY
2001 and FY 2004, the SEC increased its enforcement activity by 32%.22
Not only have the numbers of enforcement actions increased, but so, too,
have the penalties accompanying those actions.23 In FY 2002, the SEC
imposed its first $10 million penalty against a public corporation; over the
next two years, the SEC imposed sixty penalties of that amount or more.24
19 See id. § 7246.
20 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000 & Supp. 2 2003) (increasing imprisonment for mail
and wire fraud from five to twenty years); 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2000 & Supp. 2 2003)
(increasing imprisonment for ERISA violations from one to ten years and increasing fines
from $100,000 to $500,000); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (for violations of the Securities Exchange
Act, increasing imprisonment for individuals from ten years to twenty years, and increasing
fines from $1 million to $5 million for individuals and from $2.5 million to $25 million for
corporations).
21 In FY 2002, the SEC was appropriated $438 million for its annual budget. See Harvey
L. Pitt, SEC Chairman, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, and
the Judiciary, of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 17,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/041702tshlp.htm. In FY 2003,
2004, and 2005, the SEC's budget jumped to $716 million, $811 million, and $913 million,
respectively. See William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman, Testimony Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S.
Senate (Apr. 8, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/040803tswhd.htm;
William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Science,
State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies, of the Committee on Appropriations
(Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts03ll05whd.htm. Since
2002, the SEC has hired more than 840 new positions. See Donaldson, supra (Mar. 11,
2005).
22 The SEC initiated 484, 598, 678, and 639 enforcement actions in FY 2001, 2002,
2003, and 2004, respectively. See SEC ANN. REP. 2 (2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/ar02full.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 17 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ar03enforce.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 3 (2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar04stats.pdf.
23 See William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman, Testimony Concerning the Impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Before the House Committee on Financial Services (Apr. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts042105whd.htm. Since enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC has authorized recovery in over 100 cases with a total value of
$5.2 billion in disgorgement and penalties under the FAIR Funds provision of the Act. See
id. The FAIR Funds provision authorizes the SEC to establish funds for the benefit of
victims. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246.
24 See Rachel McTague, Goldschmid Defends SEC's Approach to Enforcement, Level of
Money Penalties, 37 SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 451 (2005). The SEC has imposed enormous
penalties in the years since Enron, including a $750 million penalty against WorldCom, $250
W.R. MCLUCAS, H.M SHAPIRO & J.J. SONG
It is unclear whether the use of penalties against corporations by the
SEC will subside. In January 2006, the Commission announced a long-
awaited policy regarding the imposition of penalties against corporations in
SEC actions.25 Specifically, the Commission stated that determining the
appropriateness of penalties on corporations turns on two primary
considerations: (1) "[t]he presence or absence of a direct benefit to the
corporation as a result of the violation ... [and (2) the] degree to which the
penalty will recompense or further harm the injured shareholders. 2 6 The
Commission also will consider a host of other factors, including the extent
27of the corporation's cooperation with law enforcement agencies.
As noted above, federal criminal authorities also have dramatically
increased their attention to financial fraud.28 In July 2002, the President
established the Corporate Fraud Task Force (the "Task Force") comprised
of a DOJ group focused on corporate fraud efforts within the Department,
as well as an interagency working group focused on maximizing
cooperation across the law enforcement agencies. 29  The Task Force's
second annual report noted that since its inception, it had obtained over 500
corporate fraud convictions or guilty pleas, an increase of 250 over the
previous year, and had charged over 900 defendants and 60 corporate CEOs
million penalty against Qwest, $100 million penalty against Bristol-Myers Squibb Company,
and $100 million penalty against Alliance Capital. See Stephen M. Cutler, Director, SEC
Division of Enforcement, Remarks to the Second Annual General Counsel Roundtable: Tone
at the Top: Getting it Right (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spchl 20304smc.htm.
25 See Statement of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm'n Concerning Financial
Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm [hereinafter
SEC Financial Penalties Statement]; see also SEC Sues McAfee, Inc. for Accounting Fraud,
Litig. Rel. No. 19520 (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lr19520.htm; In re Applix, Inc., Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings,
Making Findings, and Imposing Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 8A of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities
Act Release No. 8651, Exchange Act Release No. 53049 (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8651 .pdf.
26 See SEC Financial Penalties Statement, supra note 25.
27 Id. Other factors to be taken under consideration include the deterrent effect of the
penalty, the injury suffered by innocent parties, the pervasiveness of participation in the
offense by individuals throughout the corporation, the level of the wrongdoers' intent, the
difficulty of detection of the wrongdoing, and remedial steps taken by the corporation. See
id.
28 In addition, other federal and state authorities have begun focusing on corporate fraud.
See William R. McLucas et al., An Overview of SEC Enforcement, Remedial, and Settlement
Powers Before and After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1396 PLI/CoRP. 1111, 1113 (2003).
29 See Exec. Order No. 13271 (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
execorder.htm.
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and presidents with some type of crime involving corporate fraud.30 Much
of this increase in prosecution of criminal activity was attributed to a
corresponding increase in SEC investigations.31
C. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Against this backdrop, the attorney-client privilege--one of the oldest
common law testimonial privileges-has come under increasing
challenge.32 The underlying purpose of the privilege, of course, is to allow
clients to receive the most competent legal advice from fully informed
counsel.33 It is a privilege held by the client, and only the client may waive
30 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT - CORPORATE
FRAUD TASK FORCE, at iii (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
2nd_yrfraudreport.pdf.
31 In 2002, SEC investigations resulted in nearly 260 criminal filings by thirty U.S.
Attorneys' Offices. See Greg Farrell, New York No Longer Has Dibs on Securities Fraud,
USA TODAY, July 2, 2003, at lB.
32 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); see also, e.g., Lance
Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the
Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REv. 469 (2003)
(summarizing recent attacks on the privilege by federal law enforcement officers); GEORGE J.
TERWILLIGER III & DARRYL S. LEW, FEDERALIST SOC., PRIVILEGE IN PERIL: CORPORATE
COOPERATION IN THE NEW ERA OF GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS (forthcoming 2006) (on
file with authors) (reviewing federal court treatment of limited waiver agreements and
consequences of uncertain judicial treatment of such agreements).
In September 2004, the American Bar Association ("ABA") established an ABA Task
Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege to examine current developments in the areas of
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. On August 9, 2005, the ABA Task
Force adopted a resolution stating that, "the American Bar Association opposes policies,
practices and procedures of governmental bodies that have the effect of eroding the attorney-
client privilege and work product doctrine ... [and] the routine practice by government
officials of seeking to obtain a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work product
doctrine through the granting or denial of any benefit or advantage." Resolution Adopted by
the House of Delegates of the Am. Bar Ass'n (Aug. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/recommendation adopted.pdf.
33 See In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) (basis of the privilege is "to encourage clients to
make the fullest disclosures to their attorneys, to enable the latter properly to advise the
clients"); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)
("To induce clients to make (free and honest] communications, the privilege to prevent their
later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to be a necessity.") (emphasis added).
W.R. MCLUCAS, H.M SHAPIRO & J.J. SONG
it.34  Courts have long held that the attorney-client privilege applies to
corporations.
3 5
D. SEC AND DOJ POLICIES REGARDING COOPERATION
Despite the strong historical foundations of the attorney-client
privilege, its application has recently come under attack in the securities and
white collar criminal enforcement context. 36 Specifically, the SEC and DOJ
alike have announced policies for evaluating a company's cooperation in
determining whether to bring civil enforcement and criminal actions against
companies, as well as what sanctions to seek-and often that cooperation is
measured by whether the corporation has waived its attorney-client
privilege.3 7
34 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1977) ("The
privilege... belongs to the client, not the attorney; and an attorney can neither invoke nor
waive the privilege if his client desires the contrary.").
35 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (citing United States v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915)). In Upjohn Co., the Supreme
Court rejected the government's argument that the corporation's privilege protected only
communications with the company's "control group," i.e., those who had the power to
control the corporation's response to the legal advice it received. See id. at 390. Instead, the
Court held that the attorney-client privilege extends to protect communications between all
corporate employees and corporate counsel when the communications are made for the
purposes of assisting with an internal investigation. Id. at 394. The Court stressed that this
rule served the purposes of the privilege by allowing corporate counsel to have all the
relevant information "to enable him to give sound and informed advice." Id at 390.
36 The defense bar has reacted mightily to the perceived erosion of the attorney-client
privilege. For example, a broad and diverse coalition of private associations-including the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Chamber Foundation, ABA, the American Civil
Liberties Union, Association of Corporate Counsel ("ACC"), and National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL")-have joined forces to campaign against the recent
erosions of the privilege due to federal government demands for waiver. See Speakers Mull
Fixes for Perceived Erosion of Corporations'Attorney-Client Privilege, 74 U.S.L.W. (BNA)
2294 (2005).
The NACDL and the ACC recently conducted studies of outside and in-house counsel
to determine the credibility of the claim that the attorney-client privilege is under attack.
Responses from outside counsel showed that 48% believed there had been an erosion of the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine since Enron; 87% believed the privilege
recently has been challenged (25% of the time by federal prosecutors); 96% agreed that the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine serve important purposes in facilitating
their work as company counsel; and 95% agreed that the weakening of the privilege "chills a
client's frank discussion of legal issues." See NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS SuRvEY: THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IS UNDER ATTACK 2-3 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
Legislation/OvercriminalizationOO2/$FILE/AC_Survey.pdf.
37 In addition, state regulators, such as the New York Attorney General, and self-
regulatory organizations like the New York Stock Exchange, have followed the federal
regulators' lead in demanding corporate cooperation in exchange for leniency in sanctions.
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As mentioned above, in October 2001, the SEC set forth its policy on
crediting cooperation in the resolution of enforcement actions. 38  This
policy, set forth in what is known as the "Seaboard Report," listed four
broad factors the SEC considers in determining whether, and how much, to
credit a corporation's cooperation, including (1) self-policing prior to
discovering the misconduct, (2) self-reporting the misconduct upon
discovery, (3) remediation, and (4) cooperation with law enforcement
agencies. The Seaboard Report asks, "Did the Company promptly make
available to our staff the results of its [internal] review and provide
sufficient documentation reflecting its response to the situation?, 39 It also
acknowledges that waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be necessary
to demonstrate cooperation: "In some cases, the desire to provide
information to the Commission staff may cause companies to consider
choosing not to assert the attorney-client privilege, the work product
protection and other privileges, protections, and exemptions with respect to
the Commission.,
40
In the Seaboard matter, the SEC lauded the corporation's decision to
turn over documents related to the internal investigation, including notes
and transcripts from employee interviews, and not to invoke the attorney-
client privilege or work product doctrine with regard to facts uncovered in
the investigation.4 1 Since the Seaboard Report, corporations have operated
under the assumption that waiver of the attorney-client privilege is one of
the key factors in assessing cooperation with the SEC.42
On January 20, 2003, then Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson
issued a policy memorandum regarding "Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations" (the "Thompson Memo"). The Thompson
Memo is current DOJ policy and sets forth nine factors to guide DOJ
prosecutors in deciding whether to seek criminal charges against a business
See Bruce A. Green & David C. Clifton, Feeling a Chill, 91 A.B.A. J. 61, 64 (2005). New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer recently stated that because the Sentencing Guidelines
Commentary validates federal prosecutors' waiver practices, "he would be in effect foolish
not to ask for waiver in any major corporate case his office prosecutes" and that he ought to
take advantage of such an approach if the DOJ did. See STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN
CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, THE ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, AND THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS BEFORE THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION 5 (2005),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/l 115 05/VanDam-ACC-NAM.pdf.
38 See supra note 11.
39 id.
40 See id. at n.3,
41 See id.
42 See supra note 2.
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organization.43 The memo directs "increased emphasis on and scrutiny of
the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation" in making charging
decisions.44 It provides that one of the factors prosecutors should consider
in deciding whether to bring charges is "the corporation's timely and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate
attorney-client and work product protection."
4 5
The Thompson Memo directs prosecutors to consider "whether the
corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents. 46
In the eyes of the Justice Department, this can include "advancing of
attorneys' fees . . .. retaining the employees without sanction for their
misconduct, . . . providing information to the employees about the
government's investigation pursuant to a joint defense agreement, .. . [or]
attempts to shield corporate officers and employees from liability by a
willingness of the corporation to plead guilty."47  The Thompson Memo
also includes a new factor for consideration: "the adequacy of the
43 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys 1 (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo].
The Thompson Memo revises a substantially similar memorandum authored in 1999 by
former Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney
General to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys 1 (June 16, 1999), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/chargingcorps.html [hereinafter the Holder
Memo]. Unlike the Holder Memo, which allowed prosecutors discretion in deciding
whether to apply the factors for determining whether to charge a company in a particular
case, see Holder Memo, supra, at 1, the Thompson Memo requires that "in every matter
involving business crimes," a prosecutor must apply the factors. See Thompson Memo,
supra, at I (emphasis added).
44 See Thompson Memo, supra note 43, at 1.
45 Id. at 3. Other factors include the corporation's history of similar misconduct; the
corporation's remedial actions; and the adequacy of prosecuting individuals responsible for
the corporation's malfeasance. Id. In the Comment section regarding Cooperation and
Voluntary Disclosure, the Thompson Memo adds a new explanatory paragraph:
Another factor to be weighed.., is whether the corporation, while purporting to cooperate, has
engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation (whether or not rising to the level of criminal
obstruction). Examples of such conduct include: overly broad assertions of corporate
representation of employees or former employees; inappropriate directions to employees or their
counsel, such as directions not to cooperate openly and fully with the investigation including, for
example, the direction to decline to be interviewed; making presentations or submissions that
contain misleading assertions or omissions; incomplete or delayed production of records; and
failure to promptly disclose illegal conduct known to the corporation.
Id. at 6.
46 Id. at 5.
47 See id. These same considerations were also engrained in the predecessor Holder
Memo. See Holder Memo, supra note 43, at 7.
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prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's malfeasance. '4 8
Thus, not only does the Thompson Memo strongly suggest that the
corporation surrender certain basic assumptions traditionally associated
with defending itself and its employees in the name of cooperating with the,
government, but it also emphasizes the liability and potential punishment of
individuals in lieu of the corporation.4 9
This emphasis on individual liability, distinct from that of the
company, is embodied in the Thompson Memo's reasoning that,
"imposition of individual criminal liability may provide the strongest
deterrent against future corporate wrongdoing. Only rarely should provable
individual culpability not be pursued, even in the face of offers of corporate
guilty pleas."50 This last point has led to somewhat of a reversal of order in
criminal cases. Before the Thompson Memo, corporations often accepted
pleas to spare their employees the same fate. Now, however, the DOJ is
more likely to "listen to arguments that individual prosecutions obviate the
need for corporate prosecutions."5
More recently, the DOJ reiterated its policy on seeking waivers of
attorney-client privilege for corporations. On October 21, 2005, Acting
Deputy Attorney General Robert McCallum issued a memorandum
directing prosecutors to "establish a written waiver review process for
[their] district or component" (the "McCallum Memo").52 The McCallum
Memo ensures that each U.S. Attorney across the country will be ready to
strike with a demand for a privilege waiver. Significantly, it does not
require consistency or predictability across offices in making these
demands-an issue that is particularly troublesome for corporations doing
business in a global marketplace.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission has validated the DOJ view of
waiver of the attorney-client privilege by recent amendments to the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. In particular, recently amended
48 Id. at 3.
49 See Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Current Developments in the Government's Corporate
Prosecution Policy, 1517 PLI/CoRP. 829, 833 (2005).
50 See Thompson Memo, supra note 43, at 2.
51 See Howard W. Goldstein, Corporate Crime: The Thompson Memorandum, N.Y. L.J.
ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2003, at 5, available at http://www.nylj.com; see also Mary Jo White,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong? 1517 PLI/CoRP. 815, 819 (2005)
(emphasizing that the Thompson Memo's new requirement that prosecutors analyze every
corporate crime by an employee(s) in determining whether to charge a corporate employer
and requiring prosecutors to apply the Thompson factors in every case makes every
corporate crime a candidate for a corporate charge).
52 See Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General, to
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys 1 (Oct. 21, 2005), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading room/usam/title9/crm00163.htm.
W.R. MCLUCAS, H.M SHAPIRO & J.J. SONG
Commentary to § 8C2.5 states that for purposes of reducing a corporation's
culpability score, waiver of the attorney-client privilege "is not a
prerequisite .. unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide timely
and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the
organization.53  In light of this endorsement by the Sentencing
Commission of the DOJ's approach to waiver,54 public corporations are
often left with little choice but to waive the attorney-client privilege if they
hope to negotiate lenient pleas, or non-prosecution or deferred prosecution
agreements.55 As noted by the ABA, "the exception is likely to swallow the
53 See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS IN CHAPTER
EIGHT 112, 124 (2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/
RFMay04 Corp.pdf. Not surprisingly, the amended commentary has received much
criticism. As a result, the U.S. Sentencing Commission recently began efforts to reexamine
the issue, and, as of the time of the writing of this article, no resolution of those efforts has
been announced. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, PUBLIC MEETING PANEL DISCUSSION ON THE
ATrORNEY-CLIENT WAIVER AND THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/agdl 1_05.htm.
54 See Mary Beth Buchanan, Organizational Sentencing: Federal Guidelines and the
Benefits of Programs to Prevent and Detect Violations of Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
587, 589 (2004) (stating that the Thompson Memo's waiver approach is "entirely consistent"
and "based squarely on" the newly amended commentary to § 8C2.5); Elkan Abramowitz &
Barry A. Bohrer, N.Y. L.J ONLINE, Nov. 1, 2005, available at http://www.nylj.com ("In
addition to the [Thompson Memo and the McCallum Memo], the policy underscoring the
importance of corporate cooperation-often in the form of acceding to government requests to
produce privileged information-in criminal and regulatory investigations is also found in the
federal sentencing guidelines relating to organizations.").
55 Since the 2003 Thompson Memo, we have seen a growth in number of non-
prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements against corporations as alternative means
to resolving criminal government investigations when corporations cooperate. See
Thompson Memo, supra note 43, at 6 ("granting a corporation immunity or amnesty or pre-
trial diversion (i.e., a deferred prosecution agreement) may be considered in the course of the
government's investigation"); David Pitofsky, Monitor/Examiner's Role Under Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 234 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3 n.2 (Sept. 14, 2005) (noting that deferred
prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements "were originally created for cases
involving individual defendants, not organizational defendants" and that the "authorization
for federal prosecutors to enter into [such agreements] with companies comes from the so-
called 'Thompson Memo'); Timothy Coleman & Peter H. Bresnan, What Does Law
Enforcement Regard as an Effective Compliance Program? 1478 PLI/CoRP. 543, 549 (2005)
("[T]he Chapter 8 guidelines play an important role in informing the Government's
evaluation of whether to grant a deferred prosecution, and under what terms.").
Indeed, a recent report found that "prosecutors have entered into twice as many non-
prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements with major American corporations in the
last four years (twenty-three agreements between 2002 and 2005) than they have in the
previous ten years (eleven agreements between 1992 and 2001)." Crime Without
Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP., Dec.
28, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm; see
also, e.g., Letter from David Kelly, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, to
Robert S. Bennett, Counsel to KPMG LLP (Aug. 26, 2005) (deferred prosecution
[Vol. 96
2006] DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 635
rule; prosecutors will make routine requests for waivers and organizations
will be forced to routinely grant them.",
56
II. UNINTENDED COSTS OF THE NEW REGIME
Internal investigations have taken on a new prominence in the wake of
the Thompson Memo, the Seaboard Report, and the government's reaction
to the succession of corporate scandals. These investigations have long
been a feature of corporate America's efforts to address allegations of
management or employee misconduct and to ensure compliance with
various federal and state regulatory requirements. 7 But with passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley and the current SEC and DOJ emphasis on cooperation and
privilege waiver in reaction to the wave of recent corporate scandals, the
frequency and importance of internal investigations cannot be overstated.58
A. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: DIVIDING THE EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
More and more, the very prospect of an internal investigation drives a
wedge between corporations and their employees. In light of the sensitive
information often uncovered during internal investigations, they have
traditionally been conducted by attorneys and with an eye toward
agreement), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/August%2005/
KPMG%20dp%20AGMT.pdf; Letter from U.S. DOJ to Alan Vinegrad and Philip C.
Korologos, Counsel to Adelphia Communications Corp. (Apr. 25, 2005) (non-prosecution
agreement) (on file with authors); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co., Cr. No. 2:05-mj-06076 (D.N.J. 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/nj/publicaffairs/NJPress/files/pdffiles/deferredpros.pdf [hereinafter BMS Deferred
Prosecution Agreement]; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. America Online,
Inc., Cr. No. 1:04 m 1133 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
chargingdocs/aolagreement.pdf, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Cr. No. 04-837 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/cftf/chargingdocs/compassocagreement.pdf [hereinafter Computer Associates Deferred
Prosecution Agreement].
56 See Letter from Robert D. Evans, American Bar Ass'n, to U.S. Sentencing
Commission re Comments on Notice of Proposed Priorities-Chapter 8 Organizational
Guidelines, Section 8C2.5, Waiver of Attomey-Client Privilege, at 3 (Aug. 15, 2005).
57 See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text; see generally STEPHEN F. BLACK &
ANDREW N. VOLLMER, INTERNAL CORP. INVESTIGATIONS §§ 1.01-1.02 (2004) (tracing the
history of internal investigations since the 1960s).
58 See BLACK & VOLLMER, supra note 57, §§ 1.01-1.02; MARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY
LIABILITY AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY § 7.01 (2005). Sarbanes-Oxley encourages the use of
internal investigations by requiring audit committees to establish procedures for handling
complaints about financial reporting matters and requiring companies to respond to reports
by its lawyers of legal violations. See BLACK & VOLLMER, supra note 57; 15 U.S.C. §§
78(f)(m)(4), 7245 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
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maintaining the attorney-client privilege.5 9 Notwithstanding this practice,
the government's escalating demands for waiver of the privilege
increasingly extend to materials related to internal investigations.60  This
becomes particularly problematic for a company's executives and
employees-some of whom may be involved in or responsible for the
putative misconduct. Even where they have acted in the good faith belief
that their actions were appropriate and in the company's best interests, the
process itself often creates a conflict between the corporation and the
individuals managing it or serving it.
6
'
Currently, the process of an internal investigation may well force
executives and employees into a series of Hobson's choices. As a practical
matter, executives and employees must participate in the investigation
interviews or else lose their jobs. 62 Then, having participated-or having
59 See BLACK & VOLLMER, supra note 57, § 6.0211].
60 See STEINBERG, supra note 58, § 7.03 ("[T]he Government frequently seeks internal
investigation reports authored by legal counsel, witness interviews conducted by counsel in
connection with internal investigations, notes made by counsel, and documents that evidence
the legal advice provided by counsel during the internal investigation.").
In several recent SEC settlements that have recognized corporations' cooperation, the
corporations disclosed the results of their internal investigations and declined to assert the
attorney-client privilege with respect to communications during that time period. See, e.g.,
In re Monsanto Co., Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist, Making Findings, and Imposing a
Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Exchange Act Release No. 50978 (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/34-50978.htm (imposing cease and desist order and remedial undertakings, but no
monetary sanctions); Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges
Royal Ahold and Three Former Top Executives With Fraud (Oct. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-144.htm (consenting to permanent injunction, but no
monetary sanctions).
61 See N. Richard Janis, Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of the Federal
Government, WASHINGTON LAWYER, Mar. 2005, at 32; Michael Farber, Interviewing
Company Employees in the Internal Investigation: Navigating the Minefield, 19 INSIGHTS 10
(2005); John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men: Corporate Lawyers Worry that They're Doing the
Government's Bidding While Doing Internal Investigations, 89 ABA J. 46, 51 (2005)
("[C]orporate lawyers are particularly worried that Justice is trying to drive a wedge between
companies and employees."); Michael Burr, et al., The CLT Top 20: The Events, People &
Stories of 2005, 15 CORP. LEGAL TIMES 36, 42 (2005) (citing the August 2005 KPMG
deferred prosecution agreement as the fifth most significant legal development in 2005
because it represents the larger problem of attacks on attorney-client privilege due to
government demands for waiver of the privilege).
62 See Testimony of Henry W. Asbill, National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, at 4 (Nov. 15, 2005) ("Increasingly,
companies do not hesitate to fire individual employees who refuse to 'cooperate."'); Sarah
Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism, and the
Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 859, 907 (2003) ("[I]n most states, [an
employee's] refusal to cooperate with an internal investigation 'constitutes a breach of the
employee's duty of loyalty to the corporation and is good grounds' [for dismissal.]")
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considered participating-in the interviews, an executive or employee may
decide he wants outside counsel to guide him through the process. 63 While
the employee might reasonably expect his company to help pay the legal
bills associated with an inquiry into the work he did for the company-and
most companies do so-the DOJ or the SEC policies often disfavor such
support, depending upon how the government views the individual's
conduct.64 These individuals may be left in the difficult position of paying
their own legal fees or else forfeiting legal representation.65
(quoting STEPHEN F. BLACK, INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS § 1.01, §4.03 [2] (1998));
Lisa A. Mathewson & Catherine M. Recker, Joint Defense Agreements in the Corporate
Context: No Guarantees, THE CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 20, available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/698c98dd101a846085256eb400500c01/lc707e2cldf831628
52570b3006flba7?OpenDocument&Highlight=-0,1ecroy ("[C]orporations commonly
condition continued employment on cooperation with an internal investigation.").
63 For example, in the Computer Associates case, the company's executives pleaded
guilty to obstruction of justice charges on the theory that, in lying to the company's outside
counsel, they had misled federal prosecutors because the results of the investigation were
passed on the government during the company's efforts to cooperate with the government
investigation. See Alex Berenson, Case Expands Type of Lies Prosecutors Will Pursue,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at C1. In that case, the government learned of the misstatements
because the company waived its attorney-client privilege as to the internal investigation. See
Richard P. Swanson, Corporate Investigations and Common Law, 231 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2004).
64 See Thompson Memo, supra note 43; Laurie P. Cohen, U.S. Prosecutors' Tough New
Tactics Turn Firms Against Staff, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2004, at A5. In the government's
recent investigation of KPMG's marketing of illegal tax shelters, KPMG broke ranks with
one of its leading partners in the name of cooperation. See id. KPMG asked the partner to
resign and then refused to pay his legal fees unless he cooperated with the prosecutors. See
id.
When asked whether the "government [is] being unfair to company employees if it
pressures their employers not to pick up the tab," former Deputy Attorney General
Thompson responded that, "if employees really don't believe they acted with criminal intent,
'they don't need fancy legal representation,' to defend themselves. There are lots of
reasonably priced lawyers." See id.
65 See Asbill, supra note 62, at 4 ("[U]n-insured officers and emplqyees are unlikely to
have their defense costs paid if there is even a hint that they are potential targets of the
investigation; at the same time many companies will categorically refuse to pay defense
costs of employees who are seen as non-cooperating."). But see Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen,
888 A.2d 204 (Del. Supr. 2005) (holding that company executive was entitled to
advancement of legal fees under company bylaws and state corporate statute).
The recent KPMG case involving allegedly fraudulent tax shelters provides an
effective example. There, KPMG agreed to advance up to $400,000 in legal fees to each of
its thirty current and former partners and employees who were the subject of a grand jury
investigation on the condition that they agree to cooperate with the government. See Cohen,
supra note 64. This amount of money and this condition are unremarkable at first glance.
But $400,000 would be seriously inadequate to mount a vigorous defense to prosecution in a
complicated case with significant liability at risk, as this one undoubtedly is for many of the
individuals involved. Also, the deal presents the partners and employees with a Hobson's
choice: go it alone and virtually ensure personal financial ruin, or accept the partial subsidy
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Joint defense agreements, which provide a safe harbor to preserve
privilege while protecting the company's interests, offer no solace. Joint
defense agreements allow parties with different attorney-client relationships
and privileges, but with a common interest, to agree to share information
with each other for purposes of formulating their defenses without waiver.
66
Such agreements also serve the public interest by helping companies
uncover facts expeditiously and move quickly toward a resolution of issues.
A joint defense agreement may be the only way a corporation can access
the facts underlying the allegation(s) of misconduct where the employees
are separately represented. At a minimum, a joint defense agreement may
encourage employees to participate in a company's internal investigation
rather than to refuse and/or delay the investigation. But, DOJ and SEC
policies reject such agreements as well. 67
The days when joint defense agreements gave both corporation and
employees the ability to participate in internal investigations without the
risk of disclosure by the other party are rapidly passing. To former Deputy
Attorney General Comey, the very possibility of such an agreement was
baffling: "It is hard for me to understand why a corporation would ever
enter into a joint defense agreement because doing so may prevent it from
making disclosures it either must make if it is a regulated industry, or may
wish to make to a prosecutor."68  This approach oversimplifies a
complicated analysis: the obligations of a company under investigation run
not only to the government. It also has other, arguably prior, obligations to
manage itself appropriately and efficiently, and to maximize shareholder
value. When allegations of misconduct impede a corporation's ability to
effectively serve its shareholders, it might well make sense for the
corporation to enter a joint defense agreement to uncover the facts
expeditiously and to move forward with appropriate remedial steps.
Instead, the corporation and its employees are effectively consigned to their
of their legal defense while agreeing to give up their own rights in the name of
"cooperation."
66 See Mathewson & Recker, supra note 62, at 20.
67 See, e.g., Thompson Memo, supra note 43; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563,
568 (1st Cir. 2001) (permitting corporation that entered into a joint defense agreement with
its officers to unilaterally waive privilege both for itself and the officers); United States v.
LeCroy, 348 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding that employees waived the attorney-
client privilege despite a joint defense agreement with their corporation when they submitted
to interviews after the corporation indicated it might waive the privilege if pushed by the
government to do so).
68 Interview with United States Attorney James B. Comey Regarding Department of
Justice's Policy on Requesting Corporations under Criminal Investigation to Waive the
Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, U.S. ATTORNEYS' BULLETrN, Nov.
2003, at 4.
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respective comers while the threat of privilege waiver chills meaningful
discussion among those most knowledgeable of a crucial issue facing the
company.
The imbalance of power created by the demand for "cooperation" and
waiver of privilege is exacerbated by government investigations that now
effectively have no time or budgetary limits. At one time in the not-so-
distant past, the government was compelled to make triage decisions in
order to best allocate its resources for a particular investigation. DOJ and
SEC attorneys were forced to make careful calculations about the value of a
particular case and whether governmental resources were best devoted to
this or that thread of any given investigation. The costliness of
investigations, combined with real budgetary limits, operated as a natural
check on prosecutorial inquiries that could otherwise have no bounds.
Now, private lawyers are effectively "deputized" in many internal
investigations, and the government obtains the facts of their inquiry through
waiver of attorney-client privilege. 69  The new approach leverages
governmental resources and takes away the historical checks and balances
that existed in the process when the government investigated and company
counsel defended in such an investigation. When private attorneys can
effectively be commissioned into government service through a process that
will unearth every scrap of relevant information at the company's cost,
governmental budget constraints matter much less. There is no incentive to
hold back on some investigations that would otherwise be unproductive,
and the government has nearly unlimited opportunity-with a very low
threshold for cost effectiveness-to find misconduct at a public corporation.
Because the publicity and risks of a civil or criminal trial can be so
devastating to public corporations, and especially to highly regulated
corporations-both in economic and reputational terms-they are often
compelled to settle, even if it means taking positions contrary to their
officers and employees.
70
The recent increase in the use of deferred prosecution agreements
exacerbates the waiver policy vis-A-vis corporations. 71 These agreements,
many of which require waiver of the privilege, 72 give prosecutors enormous
69 See Swanson, supra note 63. Because the SEC and DOJ now franchise out
investigations to companies' counsel, the government agencies can demand evaluation into
whatever issues they choose at whatever cost to the company.
70 See id. (citing statistics demonstrating a decrease in federal trials: 11,000 cases in
1962; 12,500 cases in 1985; and 8000 cases in 2002, despite a five-fold increase in filings
over corresponding forty-year time period).
71 See supra note 55 (discussing deferred prosecution agreements).
72 See, e.g., Computer Associates Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 55.
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discretion to impose hefty penalties and remedial undertakings on
companies so that they may avoid being indicted.73 They have effectively
lowered the floor for criminal prosecution. What's more, there is limited
judicial oversight over deferred prosecution agreements. An investigation
is launched and the case largely settled before a court has weighed the first
bit of evidence or tested a single legal theory. As a result, problematic legal
issues may well simmer just below the surface with no resolution, and the
opportunity to test the issues will not arise.74
B. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE CORPORATIONS: A DIFFERENT
CALCULUS IN WAIVING PRIVILEGE
In this new era, publicly traded companies are especially susceptible to
government demands for waiver in a way that private companies are not.
Unlike a publicly held corporation that has regular disclosure and reporting
requirements to the SEC and its shareholders, a private company may well
stand on firmer ground in facing a governmental investigation. Private
companies can actually resist demands for waiver. Alleged facts can be
refuted. Spotty legal theories can be researched and challenged. In short,
the case can be developed and defended much more completely before the
company is forced to choose to settle or fight. A private company simply
does not face the punishment that publicity and controversy can inflict at
the first sign of market concern.
A public company, on the other hand, is far more at risk of substantial
harm from negative publicity. Indeed, loss of investor confidence and
reputational damage may well be overwhelming before it is even clear that
someone violated the law. Even small swings in a company's stock price
73 If we learned anything from Arthur Andersen, it was the power of an indictment to
crumble a company. The company's conviction led to dissolution and left more than 80,000
employees without jobs. See Howard W. Goldstein, Corporate Crime, N.Y. L.J. ONLINE
(Sept. 1, 2006), available at http://www.nylj.com. That the Supreme Court ultimately
reversed Arthur Andersen's conviction will not restore the thousands of lives that were
disrupted when the company dissolved. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S.
Ct. 2129, 2137 (2005).
74 DOJ's extremely strong hand at times puts its prosecutors in the position of managing
their corporate targets. For example, as part of its deferred prosecution agreement, Bristol-
Myers Squibb Company agreed to appoint one of its board members as a non-executive
chairman and to appoint an additional non-executive director acceptable to the U.S.
Attorney. See BMS Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 55; Stephen Taub,
Bristol's Former CFO Indicted, CFO.com (June 16, 2005), http://www.cfo.com/article/
cfm/4096065?f=-search. This sort of decision making by government attorneys is troubling
to the extent that the judgment that goes into performing effectively as a director of a large
public corporation is borne of many years of experience in the business world, not (possibly
a few) years as a prosecutor or staff attorney.
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today are relentlessly scrutinized by the financial press, and a combination
of a regulatory or criminal inquiry with negative press can be lethal for a
public corporation. Taking the long-term view of shareholders' interests
can thus become impossible when a short-term crisis-facing off against a
tough federal prosecutor with an indictment in hand-overwhelms the
board's ability to reason through to a sound decision.
A related casualty of this new trend of waiver demands peculiar to
public corporations is its effect on the willingness of business leaders to
assume board positions. Facing increased administrative responsibilities
and costs as well as decreased nimbleness in managing companies that
results from this imbalance of prosecutorial power, the most qualified
candidates now often refuse board positions-a trend that hurts our markets
by draining the most qualified human capital and thereby decreasing the
efficiency of public corporations.75
Moreover, when the DOJ and the SEC bring a case in tandem against a
public corporation, the company must comply or else run the risk of being
denied access to the capital markets. Unlike private companies that are not
subject to filing requirements for new issue securities registration
statements, proxy materials, and annual reports,7 6 a public corporation must
do so with the approval of the very agency (i.e., the SEC) that is
investigating it. In addition, unlike a private company, a public corporation
is subject to the pressure of possible shareholder litigation at even a hint of
governmental inquiry.
III. CONCLUSION
Internal investigations and privilege waivers are neither new nor
presumptively bad for the capital markets, as a general proposition. Indeed,
one can make the case-and prosecutors and regulators no doubt will-that
the frequency and reliance on such tools have been necessary in the wake of
the recent accounting and disclosure meltdowns by presumably once well
run, well respected public companies. It is difficult to refute governmental
assertions that these extraordinary events have demanded an extraordinary
response. Our concern is that the long-term implications of this short-term
prosecutorial response to the problem have yet to be assessed.
The traditional shared commitment by a corporation's fiduciaries to
meet its obligations to the shareholders breaks down in the face of the
government's waiver practices. At almost every turn-particularly in the
75 See Eric Dash, Executive Pay: A Special Report; For Directors, Great Expectations
(and More Pay), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, § 3, at 10.
76 See SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, 2003 CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK 4 (John C. Burch, Jr. &
Bruce S. Foerster eds., 4th ed. 2003).
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context of internal investigations-issues of personal liability and risk
threaten to prevail over the sense of duty to the shared enterprise. Today,
an employee's first instinct is often to wonder how he can protect himself,
not about how the company can right itself or, indeed, defend itself.
To approach the issues intelligently, it is not sufficient simply to
equate the waiver of the attorney-client privilege with "doing the right
thing." Gradations of both individual and corporate wrongdoing will
always exist, and company counsel, senior management, and the board of
directors should retain some role in the first instance in assessing such
issues. Indeed, the system should allow reasonable and reasoned room for a
determination to advocate zealously for the company and its employees,
including reliance on the attorney-client privilege. Different and competing
concerns will have to be carefully weighed in each instance, and the
analyses are much more complicated than the current approach presumes.
Even when people engage in misconduct, the now nearly-automatic demand
for broad-based waivers carries with it larger risks and consequences that
have yet to be fully understood, let alone properly weighed by the
government.
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